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Abstract 
 
This paper models the feasibility of common policy initiatives against global terrorism, as 
well as timelines for their enforcement. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing 
countries for the period 1984-2008. Employed terrorism dynamics are domestic, transnational, 
unclear and total terrorism. Absolute (or unconditional) and conditional catch-ups are 
modelled using Generalised Methods of Moments. We establish consistently that, the rate of 
catch-up is higher in domestic terrorism relative to transnational terrorism. The time to full 
catch-up required for the implementation of common policies without distinction of 
nationality is found to be in a horizon of 13.34-19.92 years for domestic terrorism and 24.67-
27.88 years for transnational terrorism. Hence, from a projection date of 2009, in spite of 
decreasing cross-country differences in terrorists’ attacks, there is still a long way to go before 
feasible common policy initiatives can be fully implemented without distinction of 
nationality. The paper is original by its contribution to the empirics of conflict resolution 
through decreasing cross-country differences in terrorism tendencies. Policy implications are 
discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: C52; D74; F42; K42; O38 
Keywords:  Terrorism; Common policies; Development 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors are indebted to Bandyopadhyay Subhayu, Sandler Todd, Javed Younas, and 
Uchenna Efobi for sharing the dataset.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1. Introduction  
The 2014 Global Terrorism Index (GTI, 2014, p. 13) has revealed that activities of terrorism 
have substantially increasing since the uprisings of the 2011 Arab Spring. Consistent with 
Asongu et al. (2015), post-Gaddafi Libya has become a failed State, with two rival 
governments jostling for authority and multiple rebel groups also dictating the law of the land. 
According to the account, the situation in Yemen has been deteriorating, principally because 
the government and rebels are currently engaged in a war for which they are respectively 
supported by Saudi Arabia and Iran. A fundamental cause of the political crisis has been the 
failure by government to deliver on its promises since the departure of President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016). Escalation of attacks by the Boko Haram of Nigeria is 
substantially affecting neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Another 
example of the growing geopolitical nature of terrorists activities are the externalities from the 
fragile political situation in Iraq and the on-going crisis in Syria. Accordingly, the powerful 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which now occupies more than a third of Iraq and 
half of Syria is now exerting externalities of terrorism across the globe. Some notable cases 
include: Sydney-Australian hostage crisis in December 2014; foiled Verviers-Belgium attacks 
of January 2015; failed February 2015 Australian attacks and the January 2015 Charlie 
Hebdo’ attacks in Paris-France.   
 In light of the above, there is a growing scholarly focus on the effects of terrorism on 
macroeconomic variables. It has focused on inter alia: the impact of terrorism on foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008), nexuses between terrorists activities 
and economic development (Meierrieks & Gries, 2013; Choi, 2015), resource-wealth in the 
management of conflicts (Humphreys, 2005), the effect of terrorism on innovation (Koh, 
2007) and the role of development assistance in reducing the potentially negative impact of 
terrorism on FDI (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Efobi et al., 2015). This study is closest to the 
last current of the literature.  
 Another stream of the literature has been assessing channels by which political 
violence and terrorism can be mitigated. Some recently documented mechanisms have 
included: respect of the rule of law (Choi, 2010); education (Brockhoff et al., 2014) by means 
of bilingualism (Costa et al., 2008) and lifelong learning (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016); 
control of corruption being the most effective tool in the fight against crimes and conflicts 
(Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2016); strategies based on assessing terrorism attitudes (Gardner, 
2007); the role of geopolitical fluctuations (Straus, 2012); military mechanisms (Feridun & 
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Shahbaz, 2010); press freedom and publicity (Hoffman et al., 2013) and external as well as 
internal transparency (Bell et al., 2014 ).  
Unfortunately, as far as we have reviewed, the literature has failed to explore 
possibilities of policy harmonization against terrorism. We address this shortcoming by 
providing empirics from which horizons for common policy initiatives could be established. 
The intuition for the study is consistent with a recent study on predicting the Arab Spring  
(Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015). Theoretical underpinnings for the empirics are also typically 
consistent with cross-country convergence studies that have been substantially assessed 
within the context of neoclassical growth models and recently extended to other economic 
development fields (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 
1992; Barro  & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Fung, 2009 ; Mayer-Foulkes, 2010; Narayan et al., 
2011; Bruno et al., 2012). Notable studies employing this intuition for common policies 
include: trajectories toward harmonizing intellectual property rights (IPRs) against software 
piracy (Asongu, 2013a; Andrés & Asongu, 2013); harmonizing policies for the fight against 
capital flight (Asongu, 2014a) and predicting the Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015).  
Given the above, we are consistent with Costantini and Lupi (2005) and Narayan et al. 
(2011) in postulating that reporting facts based on intuition is a useful scientific activity even 
in the absence of a formal theoretical model. Accordingly, Applied econometrics should not 
be exclusively limited to either refuting or accepting existing theories. Consistent with 
underlying literature on harmonization common policies (Asongu, 2013a, 2014a), it is 
reasonable to postulate that the reduction of cross-country differences in terrorism activities 
imply the feasibility of common policies among sampled countries. Moreover, complete 
elimination of cross-country dispersions or differences means that the underlying feasible 
policies can be implemented without distinction of locality or nationality.  
In light of the above, the contribution of this study to the literature is at least twofold. 
First, by employing a recent methodological innovation on the estimation of beta-
convergence, it contributes to the empirics of conflicts resolution by means of common policy 
initiatives. Second, it contributes to the literature on fighting terrorism above by providing 
trajectories and tendencies by which countries can adopt common positions.  
The scope of the line of inquiry is developing countries because negative effects of 
terrorism are relatively more detrimental to developing nations than they are to advanced 
countries. For instance Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) have shown that compared to 
developed countries which can easily absorb terrorism externalities without negative 
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economic consequences, developing countries lack the financial resources and environmental 
robustness needed to absorb underlying negative shocks. The rest of the study is organised as 
follows. Section 2 presents the intuition and linkage with theoretical underpinnings. The data 
and methodology are covered in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the empirical analysis. We 
conclude with Section 5.  
 
2. Intuitions for the empirics and linkage with conflict resolution  
2.1 Intuition for the empirics  
In accordance with Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) and Asongu (2014b), initial theories of 
growth that progressed with the re-emergence of neoclassical revolution after the fall of 
Keynesianism have facilitated the convergence process among nations. New economic growth 
theories which forecasted absolute convergence were founded with the extension of concepts 
of market equilibrium (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010).  Therefore catch-up among nations was the 
product of ‘free-market-competition’ policies that favoured convergence processes. Initial 
studies on catch-up that established the presence of absolute divergence (or absence of catch-
up) in per capita income (Barro, 1991) have withstood empirical scrutiny in the long-term 
(Pritchett, 1997). The bulk of studies are consistent with the position that, regardless of initial 
income levels, within the framework of an exogenous neoclassical growth model, there is 
convergence in income levels to each country’s long-term equilibrium or to a common steady 
state. Conversely, the endogenous growth theory posits that convergence in income-levels is 
unfeasible for at least a twofold reason: disparities in initial endowments and the possibility of 
multiple equilibria. 
 In light of the above, the intuition for the present line of inquiry is in accordance with 
the income convergence literature that has recently been extended to other development 
fields. Studies based on convergence have been substantially documented in the context of 
neoclassical growth models, originally developed by the seminal works of Baumol (1986), 
Barro (1991), Mankiw et al. (1992) and Barro  and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995). As highlighted 
in the introduction, the theoretical underpinnings (Solow, 1956; Swan, 1956) of the income 
catch-up literature have recently been applied to other areas of economic development. 
Accordingly, while there is some consensus on an income catch-up theory other branches of 
development do not yet have a catch-up theory carefully worked-out. Nonetheless, from 
common sense, there is naturally some form of catch-up in positive or negative development 
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indicators. Hence, there is a policy challenge for development studies to model corresponding 
changes in development dispersions.  
This challenge has given birth to a growing stream of literature devoted to extending 
theoretical underpinnings of convergence to other development areas, namely in:  financial 
markets (Narayan et al., 2011; Bruno et al., 2012; Asongu, 2013b), IPRs (Asongu, 2013a; 
Andrés & Asongu, 2013), illicit capital flight (Asongu, 2014a) and negative signals prompting 
political instability and violence like, bad governance, unemployment and chaotic inflation 
(Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015). Therefore, the present line of inquiry is simply extending this 
stream of empirical literature on adopting common policies in the fight against negative 
economic signals. But before we engage these empirics, it is relevant to discuss how the 
intuitions for the empirics in Section 2.1 are linked to mechanisms of conflict resolution.  
 
2.2 Intuition for terrorism catch-up and theoretical underpinnings of conflict resolution 
 
 The link between terrorism catch-up and theoretical underpinnings of conflict 
resolution is based on the intuition that, with reduction in cross-country dispersions in terrorist 
activities, sampled countries are more likely to adopt common conflict resolution policies 
because of declining differences in terrorism tendencies. Some of the conflict resolution 
mechanisms are articulated by the Social Control Theory of Black and Conflict Management 
Model of Thomas-Kilman. These theoretical underpinnings which are documented by  
Akinwale (2010, p. 125) have motivated recent literature on conflict resolution, notably on the 
fight against: political instability and non-violence (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016) and 
terrorism (Asongu et al., 2015).  
 The Conflict Management Model emphasises that strategic intentions that are most 
probable of revolving around a two-factor matrix (of cooperation and assertiveness) which 
when combined with collaboration yields five principal styles of conflict management, 
namely: accommodation, avoidance, collaboration, competition and compromise. The Social 
Control Theory on the other hand, posits that nexuses among groups, organisations and 
individuals considerably influence the exercise of one of five main social control instruments, 
notably: avoidance, negotiation, self-help, settlement and tolerance. This narrative is broadly 
consistent with literature on conflict management (Black, 1990; Thomas, 1992; Borg, 1992; 
Volkema & Bergmann, 1995). 
 The highlighted theoretical underpinnings are relevant to the present line of inquiry in 
the view that variables in the conditioning information set (or control variables) influence 
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conditional terrorism modelling. Accordingly, conditional catch-up in terrorism tendencies 
occurs if there are cross-country differences in the conditioning information set or 
determinants of terrorism. Such determinants either fuel or mitigate conditions for conflicts, 
political violence and terrorist activities. While we justify the choice of the conditioning 
information set used by the study in the section the fallows, the interested reader can find 
more insights into other factors in the wealth of literature on political instability and violence 
(Heyneman, 2002; Beets, 2005; Heyneman, 2008ab; Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2009).  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
We employ terrorism data from Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) and Efobi et al. (2015) on a 
panel of 78 developing countries for the period 1984-2008
1
. While the size of the sample is 
based on constraints in data availability, the choice of 2008 as end of year is to enable some 
timeline for a projection date. For instance Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) in predicting the 
2011 Arab Spring, have used the year 2006 as projection date. The data begins in 1984 
because institutional variables from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2010) 
dataset are only available from this year. Consistent with Islam (1995) and Fung (2009) is it 
unlikely to find convergence using annual data because of business cycle or short-run 
disturbances may loom substantially. Hence, in order to address this concern, our data 
consists of three year averages or non-overlapping intervals.  
 The dependent variables are terrorism dynamics, notably: domestic, transnational, 
unclear and total terrorism. The last indicator is the sum of the first-three. The interest of 
using a plethora of terrorism variables is to provide more room for policy options. The 
conditional information set for conditional convergence modelling entails: political 
globalisation, civil conflicts, inflation, exchange rate, foreign aid and GDP growth. The 
underlying variables documented as causes of the Arab Spring (Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012 
) have been employed in the prediction of the Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015) 
                                                          
1
 The adopted countries include: “Albania, Costa Rica, India, Namibia, Syria, Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Indonesia, 
Nicaragua, Tanzania, Angola, Dominican Republic, Iran, Niger, Thailand, Argentina, Ecuador, Jamaica, Nigeria, 
Togo, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Trinidad and Tobago, Bangladesh,  El Salvador, Kenya, Panama, 
Tunisia, Bolivia, Ethiopia, Lebanon, Papua New Guinea, Turkey, Botswana, Gabon, Libya, Paraguay, Uganda, 
Brazil, Gambia, Madagascar, Peru, Uruguay, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Philippines, Venezuela, Cameroon, 
Guatemala, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Chile, Guinea, Mali, Senegal, Yemen, China, Guinea-Bissau, 
Malta, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Colombia, Guyana ,Mexico, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Congo, D. Republic, Haiti, 
Morocco, Sri Lanka, Congo Republic, Honduras, Mozambique and Sudan”. 
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and as control indicators in the role of lifelong learning on political stability and non-violence 
(Asongu & Nwuchukwu, 2016). Accordingly, a recent stream of the literature has been 
premised on the use of foreign aid to fight terrorism (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; 
Bandyopadhyay & Younas, 2014). But the expected sign may also be different because 
increased levels of development assistance have been associated with growing political 
instability (Eubank, 2012). Political globalisation is linked with increased possibilities of 
conflicts (Lalountas et al., 2011). High inflation should intuitively be associated with political 
strife due to inter alia: diminishing purchasing power and (ii) reducing domestic investment 
because of a negative economic outlook. Internal or civil conflicts should logically increase 
the likelihood for terrorist activities. The definitions of the variables are provided in Table 1. 
  
Table 1: Definition and source of variables 
    
Variables Signs Definitions Sources 
    
GDP growth  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bandyopadhyay 
et al. (2014) 
and Efobi et al. 
(2015) 
   
Infrastructure  LnTel  Ln. of Number of Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
   
Inflation  LnInflation Ln. of Consumer Price Index (% of annual) 
   
Exchange rate LnXrate  Ln. of  Exchange rate (local currency per USD) 
   
Bilateral Aid  LnBilaid Ln. of Bilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Multilateral Aid  LnMulaid Ln. of Multilateral aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Total Aid  LnTotaid Ln. of Total aid, net disbursement (million USD) 
   
Domestic terrorism Domter Ln. of Number of Domestic terrorism incidents 
   
Transnational 
terrorism 
Tranater Ln. of Number of Transnational terrorism incidents 
 
   
Unclear terrorism  Unclter Ln. of Number of terrorism incidents whose category in 
unclear 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Ln. of Total number of terrorism incidents  
   
Political 
globalisation 
LnPolglob  Ln. of  Index of political globalisation  
   
Internal conflicts  Civcon Index of  internal civil conflicts  
    
GDP: Gross Domestic Product. WDI: World Development Indicators. Ln: Logarithm.  
 
In Table 2, we provide the summary statistics of the variables. Some are transformed in 
logarithm to enable the comparison of means. Moreover, as we shall see in the methodology 
section below, the dependent variable in catch-up modelling should be defined in logarithm.  
We also notice that there is a substantial variation in the variables, implying we can be 
confident that significant estimated relationships would emerge.  
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Table 2: Summary statistics  
      
 Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Obs 
      
GDP growth 3.852 3.467 -10.933 17.339 612 
      
Infrastructure (ln) 1.475 1.017 0.091 4.031 616 
      
Inflation (ln) 2.414 1.384 -3.434 9.136 581 
      
Exchange rate (ln) 2.908 3.870 -22.121 21.529 618 
      
Bilateral Aid (ln) 5.181 1.286 0.765 8.362 602 
      
Multilateral Aid (ln) 4.163 1.518 -1.249 7.105 600 
      
Total Aid (ln) 5.550 1.276 0.800 8.495 608 
      
Domestic terrorism (ln) 1.316 1.849 -1.098 6.038 405 
      
Transnational terrorism (ln) 0.530 1.243 -1.098 4.143 353 
      
Unclear terrorism (ln) 0.471 1.452 -1.098 4.454 224 
      
Total terrorism (ln) 1.490 1.847 -1.098 6.168 451 
      
Political globalisation (ln) 4.036 0.301 2.861 4.530 624 
      
Internal conflicts 0.965 1.906 0 10 615 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Obs: Observations. 
 
 The purpose of Table 3 is to limit issues of overparameterization and multicollinearity 
which have been highlighted in bold.  We notice that terrorism and foreign aid indicators are 
respectively highly correlated among themselves. Therefore, we address the underlying issues 
by employing only total aid in the specifications. The concern is not relevant for the terrorism 
indicators because they are used exclusively as dependent variables.  
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix (n=174, with uniform sample size) 
              
GDPg LnTel LnInflation LnXrate LnBilad LnMulaid LnTotaid LnDomter LnTranater LnUnclter LnTotter LnPolglob Civcon  
1.000 0.058 -0.334 0.202 0.230 0.179 0.227 -0.094 0.015 -0.131 -0.077 0.117 -0.048 GDPg 
 1.000 -0.039 0.080 -0.256 -0.504 -0.363 0.173 0.188 0.026 0.172 0.362 -0.248 LnTel 
  1.000 -0.454 -0.287 -0.218 -0.297 0.066 0.107 0.029 0.057 -0.175 0.067 LnInflation 
   1.000 0.102 0.116 0.127 -0.077 -0.016 -0.061 -0.070 0.161 -0.075 LnXrate 
    1.000 0.590 0.958 0.110 0.042 0.068 0.118 0.277 0.190 LnBilaid 
     1.000 0.772 -0.034 -0.131 0.015 -0.035 0.046 0.196 LnMulaid 
      1.000 0.081 -0.001 0.064 0.087 0.252 0.206 LnTotaid 
       1.000 0.702 0.738 0.975 0.249 0.457 Domter 
        1.000 0.597 0.789 0.187 0.402 Tranater 
         1.000 0.810 0.092 0.414 Unclter 
          1.000 0.251 0.472 Totter 
           1.000 -0.068 LnPolglob 
            1.000 Civcon 
              
GDPg: GDP growth rate.  LnTel: Number of Telephone lines. LnXrate: Exchange rate.  LnBilaid: Bilateral aid. LnMulaid: Multilater aid.  LnTotaid: Total aid.  LnDomter:  
Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  LnTranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. LnUnclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.   
LnTotter: Total number of terrorism incidents.   LnPolglob: Index of political globalisation. Civcon:  Index of internal civil conflicts. 
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3. 2 Methodology 
 
 Following Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015) and Narayan et al. (2011), the  beta-
convergence approach adopted in these empirics is consistent  with the underpinnings of 
recent catch-up literature. In essence, the estimation strategy is in accordance with the bulk of 
evidence on cross-country income convergence that have been examined within the 
framework of pioneering studies in classical growth models (Baumol, 1986; Mankiw et al., 
1992; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995). 
 According to Fung (2009), the two equations below denote the standard procedures for 
assessing conditional beta-convergence if  tiW ,  is considered as strictly exogenous. 
titititititi WYYY ,,,,, )ln()ln()ln(             (1) 
tititititi WYaY ,,,, )ln()ln(                           (2) 
Where a = 1+ β, tiY ,  is the measure of the terrorism situation in country i at period t.   is tau,  
tiW ,  is a vector of determinants of terrorism,  i  is a country-specific effect,  t  is a time- 
specific constant and  ti ,  an error term. Consistent with the neoclassical growth model, a 
negative and statistically significant beta coefficient in Eq. (1) means that countries relatively 
close to their steady state in terrorism activities will experience a slowdown in terrorism 
activities known as conditional convergence (Narayan et al., 2011, p. 2773).  In the same vein, 
as sustained by Fung (2009, p. 59), if  10  a in Eq. (2), then  tiY ,  is dynamically stable 
around the  path with a trend growth rate similar to that of  tW  and with a height relative to 
the level of tW .  Indicators contained in tiW ,  and the individual effects i  are proxies for the 
long-term level terrorism is converging towards. In essence, the country-specific effect i  
measures other factors determining a country’s steady state that are not captured by tiW , .  
 According to Asongu and Nwachukwu (2015), conditions for catch-up as emphasized 
above are valid only if tiW ,  is strictly exogenous. In reality unfortunately, this is not the case 
because whereas components of tiW ,  (political globalisation, civil conflicts, inflation, 
exchange rate, foreign aid and GDP growth) influence terrorism, the reverse effect is also 
possible. As we have seen in the introduction, a stream of the literature has been devoted to 
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the effects of terrorism on macroeconomic variables. Consequently we are confronted with an 
issue of endogeneity because components of tiW ,  are correlated with the error term ( ti , ).  
In addition, country- and time-specific effects could be correlated with other variables 
in the model as is often the case when lagged endogenous indicators are introduced into the 
equations. A means of addressing this concern of the correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and individual specific-effects involves suppressing the individual-effect 
by first differencing. Hence Eq. (2) becomes:  
)()()())ln()(ln()ln()ln( ,,2,,2,,,,     tititttitititititi WWYYaYY       (3)  
  
Unfortunately, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations still result in biased 
estimators because of the presence of correlations between the lagged dependent variable and 
the error term. Arellano and Bond (1991) have proposed the use of Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) which exploits all the orthogonality conditions between the error term and 
the lagged endogenous variables. The procedure uses lagged levels of the variables as 
instruments in the differenced equation and lagged differences of the variables as instruments 
in the level equation, thus making-use of all the orthogonality conditions between the error 
term and the lagged dependent variables. We use both the Difference (Arellano & Bond, 
1991) and System (Arellano & Bover, 1995) GMM techniques but, consistent with Bond et al. 
(2001, pp. 3-4)
2
  we prefer the latter in cases of conflict of interests in results.  
 The adopted GMM estimation strategy combines Equations (2) and (3). In the 
specification procedure, we apply the two-step GMM  to account for heteroscedasticity in the 
residuals. This is essentially because; the one-step process is homoscedasticity-consistent. The 
hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals is very crucial because lagged 
regressors are to be used as instruments for the dependent indicators. Hence, the estimation 
substantially depends on the hypothesis that lags of the dependent variable and other 
independent regressors are valid instruments in the regression. We expect the first-order 
autocorrelation (AR [1]) of the residuals to be significant whereas the second-order 
correlation (AR [2]) to be insignificant.  The latter which is more relevant is reported because 
                                                          
2
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the 
initial conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series and it has been 
shown to perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially 
consistent with standard growth frameworks and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical 
application. Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth 
research”. (Bond et al. 2001, pp. 3-4).  
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it measures the autocorrelation in difference. The Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR)  
test is employed to investigate the validity of instruments.  
 In line with Islam (1995, p. 323), yearly intervals are inappropriate for investigating 
catch-up because corresponding time intervals are too short. Therefore, in such brief time 
spans, short-term disturbances may loom substantially large.  In this light, considering a 24 
year period (1985-2008), we use three-year non-overlapping intervals (NOI)
3
.  In addition to 
the justifications for the choice of NOI provided above, we discuss three more reasons for the 
choice of three-year NOI. First, while NOI with higher numerical values mitigate business 
cycle disturbances they also weaken the model. Motivated by the need to exploit as much 
time series properties as possible, three-year NOI are preferred to four/five-year NOI. Second, 
more degrees of freedom are required in conditional convergence modelling. Hence, a higher 
order of NOI will substantially limit the size of the conditioning information set. This is 
essential because in the presence of low degrees of freedom, a correspondingly lower number 
of control variables are required. This is based on the intuition that with constraints in degrees 
of freedom, the order of NOI bears an inverse relationship with the number of control 
variables employed. Third, from a heuristic perspective, visual analysis does not reveal 
substantial evidence of persistent short-term (business cycle) disturbances that justify higher 
NOI.  The above three additional explanations have also been provided for the empirics of 
IPRs harmonization (Asongu, 2013a) and prediction of the Arab Spring (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2015).  
 In order to examine the rate of diminishing differences in terrorism dynamics, we 
compute the implied rate of convergence by calculating  a/3. Hence, we divide the estimated 
value of the lagged dependent variable by 3 because we have used three-year NOI to mitigate 
short-run disturbances. Hence,   is equals to 3. The criterion employed to assess the presence 
of convergence is ‘ 10  a ’, which implies that the absolute value of the estimated lagged 
dependent variable is less than one but greater than zero. It also means that past differences 
exert a less proportionate impact on future variations, such that the left-hand-side of Eq. (3) is 
decreasing over time or countries moving toward equilibria.  
 Given the empirical dimension of this study, we devote some space to clarifying the 
adopted criterion for convergence. In a standard GMM approach, the estimated lagged value 
is a  from which 1 is subtracted to obtain β (β= a-1). In this light, 0  is the information 
                                                          
3
 Accordingly, we have eight three-year non-overlapping intervals: 1985-1987; 1988-1990; 1991-1993; 1994-
1996; 1997-1999; 2000-2002; 2003-2005 and 2006-2008.  
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criterion employed for beta-convergence. For the purpose of clarity and simplicity, a could be 
reported instead of β and the underlying information criterion ( 10  a ) used to establish 
the presence of catch-up. This latter interpretation is consistent with recent convergence 
literature (Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012a, p. 20; Prochniak & Witkowski, 2012b, p. 23). 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results 
 This section investigates three principal issues: (1) assessment of diminishing 
dispersions (or presence of catch-up processes) in terrorism (domestic, transnational, unclear 
and total) dynamics; (2) computation of the rate of reduction in dispersions (rate of catch-up) 
and (3) determination of the time needed for the complete elimination of dispersions (time 
required for full catch-up). The first issue guides the empirics on the feasibility of a process 
based on similar conditions in the dependent variables across countries; the second determines 
the degree of similarity in the underlying conditions, whereas the third reflects the time 
required for the underlying similarities to be complete or dissimilarities to be 
indistinguishable across countries. In other words, while the presence of convergence implies 
that common cross-country policies can be adopted, the evidence of full convergence means 
that such policies can be implemented among sampled countries, without distinction of 
nationality.  
 Table 2 below summarizes overall findings presented while Tables 3 and 4 
respectively presents, results for absolute (unconditional) and conditional catch-up. Absolute 
catch-up is estimated exclusively with the lagged endogenous variable as independent 
variable while conditional convergence is modelled with the control variables (or conditioning 
information set). In other words, the former is estimated in the absence of tiW , : vector of 
determinants (political globalisation, civil conflicts, inflation, exchange rate, foreign aid and 
GDP growth) of the terrorism variables.  
 In order to assess the validity of the models and therefore the catch-up hypotheses, we 
performs two tests, namely: (1) the Arellano and Bond test for autocorrelation that examines  
the null hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation and (2) the Sargan test that investigates 
the overidentification restrictions. Accordingly, the latter test assesses whether underlying 
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the main equation and its null hypothesis is 
the absence of endogeneity (or strict exogeneity of the instruments as a group).  We also 
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report the Wald statistics for the joint significance of estimated coefficients. We notice 
overwhelmingly that for most of the estimated models: (1) the null hypotheses for the AR(2) 
and  Sargan tests are not rejected and (2) the null hypothesis of the Wald statistics is rejected. 
We also ensure that the rule of thumb needed to avoid the proliferation of instruments is 
respected in almost all the models. In other words, for most specifications, the number of 
instruments is less than the number of cross-sections.  
 In light of the empirical dimension of this paper, it is relevant to devote space to 
clarifying how the values of catch-up rates and corresponding time to full convergence are 
computed. Given an estimated coefficient for an initial lagged value of 0.629 that is 
significant with no autocorrelation in the residuals and has valid instruments:  (1) the catch-up 
rate is 20.90% ([0.629/3]*100) and (2) the length of time needed for full catch-up is 14.35 
years (300%/20.90%).  Therefore 14 years and approximately 128 days are needed to achieve 
100% catch-up for an estimated initial value of 0.629 that is consistent with the information 
criterion: 10  a . 
 A summary of results is presented in Table 4. It is based on Tables 5-6. Whereas the 
left-hand-side of Table 4 presents results for the Difference GMM, the right-hand-side shows 
findings for the System GMM. The findings of the latter are relatively more significant than 
those of the former.  Panel A synthesises the findings of absolute convergence (AC), while 
Panel B shows those of conditional convergence (CC). Results of CC are further sub-divided 
into specification categories for robustness purposes. As we have seen above, in event of 
conflict of interest between the Difference and System GMM estimators, we shall give 
preference to the System estimation. Moreover, it is logical to also give preference to Panel 
B2 of CC which has incorporated more control variables because the conditioning of CC on 
more control variables is more feasible or close to reality.  
 The following findings can therefore be established with respect to: (i) System GMM 
results and (ii) the second specification of CC. First, while the other terrorism dynamics 
consistently reveal significant results, the finding for unclear (total) terrorism is not significant 
for CC (AC).  Second, irrespective of catch-up dynamic, the rate of catch-up is higher for 
domestic terrorism relative to transnational terrorism. (1) Full AC can be achieved between 
12.34 and 24.67 years (yrs) with corresponding catch-up rates of 24.30% and 12.16% per 
annum (pa) for domestic and transnational terrorism respectively. (2) Full CC can be achieved 
between 19.92 and 27.88 years (yrs) with corresponding catch-up rates of 15.60% and 10.76% 
pa for domestic and transnational terrorism respectively. Third, it follows from the third point 
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above that from a projection date of 2009, common policies against domestic terrorism can be 
adopted within a horizon of  13.34-19.92 yrs while those on transnational terrorism within 
24.67-27.88 yrs.  
 
Table 4: Summary of results  
         
 Difference GMM System GMM 
 Panel A: Absolute Convergence (AC) 
 LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter 
AC? No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Rate of AC na 7.86% na 20.96% 24.30% 12.16% 16.96% na 
Years to AC na 38.16Yrs na 14.31Yrs 12.34Yrs 24.67Yrs 17.68Yrs na 
         
 Panel B: Conditional Convergence (CC) 
 Panel B1: Specification 1 
 LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter 
CC? No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Rate of CC na na na 13.60% 18.2% 8.96% na 15.50% 
Years to CC na na na 22.05Yrs 16.48Yrs 33.48Yrs na 19.35Yrs 
         
 Panel B2: Specification 2 
 LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter 
CC? Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Rate of CC 15.96% 9.80% na 14.26 15.06% 10.76% na 14.03% 
Years to CC 18.79Yrs 30.61Yrs na 21.03Yrs 19.92Yrs 27.88Yrs na 21.38Yrs 
         
Yes: Significant evidence of Catch-up. No: insignificant evidence of Catch-up. AC: Absolute Catch-up. CC: Conditional Catch-up. Rate of  
AC: Rate of  Absolute Catch-up.  Rate of  CC: Rate of Conditional Catch-up in years. FAC: Full Absolute Catch-up. FCC: Full Conditional 
Catch-up.  LnDomter: Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  LnTranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. LnUnclter: 
Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  LnTotter: Total number of terrorism incidents. 
 
  
Table 5: Absolute Convergence  
         
 Difference GMM System GMM 
   
 LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter 
         
Initial  0.067*** 0.236* 0.223 0.629*** 0.729*** 0.365*** 0.509*** 0.700*** 
 (0.000) (0.099) (0.431) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.085) (0.140) (0.655) (0.712) (0.105) (0.195) (0.358) (0.699) 
OIR  (0.578) (0.341) (0.691) (0.201) (0.285) (0.174) (0.589) (0.083) 
Wald  12.945*** 2.717* 0.618 16.528*** 54.420*** 5.193** 6.756*** 43.989*** 
Instruments  27 27 27 27 34 34 34 34 
Countries  62 54 32 71 62 54 32 71 
Observations 226 182 91 268 288 236 123 339 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. LnDomter: Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  
LnTranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. LnUnclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  LnTotter: 
Total number of terrorism incidents.Initial: Lagged dependent variable.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Sargan 
Overidentifying Restrictions test.. Wald: Wald statistics for joint significance of estimated coefficients. P-values in bracket. The significance 
of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: 
a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
 
Most of the significant control variables in Table 6 have the expected signs. As we 
have projected in the Data section, political globalisation, civil conflicts and inflation are very 
likely to create an atmosphere conducive to, political instability and violence which 
eventually directly or indirectly breed terrorists’ activities.  
17 
 
Table 6: Conditional Convergence  
         
 Difference GMM System GMM 
   
 Panel A: Specification 1 
  
 LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter 
         
Initial  0.562*** 0.241 0.201 0.408*** 0.546*** 0.269* 0.262 0.465*** 
 (0.000) (0.106) (0.472) (0.005) (0.000) (0.084) (0.234) (0.000) 
Constant  0.029 0.524** −0.314 0.117 −2.480 −2.391* −3.679* −3.501* 
 (0.904) (0.018) (0.344) (0.645) (0.108) (0.053) (0.085) (0.066) 
Political globalisation −0.400 −0.562 −0.078 0.019 0.823** 0.724** 1.035* 1.088** 
 (0.722) (0.393) (0.961) (0.983) (0.046) (0.029) (0.085) (0.028) 
Civil Conflicts  0.249*** 0.142*** 0.092 0.360*** 0.240*** 0.143*** 0.230*** 0.313*** 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.313) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation  0.117 0.014 0.009 0.115 0.048 0.034 −0.055 0.082 
 (0.142) (0.848) (0.940) (0.104) (0.265) (0.439) (0.528) (0.192) 
         
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.166) (0.305) (0.497) (0.603) (0.286) (0.321) (0.245) (0.616) 
OIR  (0.022) (0.327) (0.695) (0.271) (0.337) (0.277) (0.821) (0.251) 
Wald  11.70** 13.332*** 1.324 43.88*** 151.50*** 50.52*** 85.83*** 232.64*** 
Instruments  25 30 30 30 37 37 37 37 
Countries  60 52 32 67 60 52 32 67 
Observations 217 176 91 254 277 228 123 321 
         
         
 Panel B: Specification 2 
  
 LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter LnDomter LnTranster LnUnclter LnTotter 
         
Initial  0.479*** 0.294* 0.236 0.428*** 0.452*** 0.323* 0.308 0.421*** 
 (0.007) (0.085) (0.329) (0.005) (0.001) (0.064) (0.265) (0.000) 
Constant  0.007 0.490* −0.261 0.282 −3.134* −1.821 −3.518 −3.787** 
 (0.979) (0.083) (0.535) (0.278) (0.058) (0.140) (0.264) (0.045) 
Political globalisation −0.266 −0.661 0.248 −0.145 0.874* 0.515 0.915 1.061** 
 (0.830) (0.377) (0.887) (0.877) (0.057) (0.120) (0.187) (0.043) 
Civil Conflicts  0.211** 0.142** 0.073 0.395*** 0.269*** 0.157*** 0.222*** 0.330*** 
 (0.031) (0.019) (0.418) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) 
Inflation  0.129 0.049 −0.109 0.142** 0.057 0.059 −0.058 0.102 
 (0.105) (0.574) (0.557) (0.018) (0.361) (0.210) (0.505) (0.141) 
Exchange Rate −0.045 −0.059 −0.116 −0.139** 0.055* 0.027 0.038 0.018 
 (0.557) (0.310) (0.360) (0.046) (0.064) (0.338) (0.526) (0.598) 
Foreign Aid 0.250 0.208 0.188 0.151 0.119 −0.001 0.047 0.051 
 (0.189) (0.173) (0.581) (0.438) (0.293) (0.981) (0.776) (0.594) 
GDP growth  −0.011 0.026 −0.059 0.013 −0.009 0.037 −0.046 0.010 
 (0.662) (0.302) (0.317) (0.615) (0.677) (0.193) (0.280) (0.721) 
         
Time effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.190) (0.882) (0.504) (0.477) (0.331) (0.463) (0.218) (0.607) 
OIR  (0.524) (0.420) (0.675) (0.412) (0.349) (0.191) (0.812) (0.209) 
Wald  33.649*** 17.294** 5.325 66.171*** 188.20*** 48.688*** 53.425*** 213.52*** 
Instruments  33 33 33 33 40 40 40 40 
Countries  60 52 32 67 60 52 32 67 
Observations 212 169 90 247 272 221 122 314 
         
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. LnDomter: Number of Domestic terrorism incidents.  
LnTranater: Number of Transnational terrorism incidents. LnUnclter: Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear.  LnTotter: 
Total number of terrorism incidents. Initial: Lagged dependent variable.  AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Sargan 
Overidentifying Restrictions test.. Wald: Wald statistics for joint significance of estimated coefficients. P-values in bracket. The significance 
of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: 
a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test.  
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4.2 Further discussion of results, policy implications and caveats  
 
 In accordance with the recent stream of literature that has extended the theoretical 
underpinnings of income convergence to other development areas, it is important to clearly 
articulate the context of AC and CC before discussing the results (Asongu, 2013a; Narayan et 
al., 2011; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2015). AC is primarily the basis for common initiatives, 
factors or policies, among others: economic unions and the adoption of common currency. 
Meanwhile, the framework on which this study is aligned extends well beyond 
monetary/economic unions to common terrorism policies across countries. Therefore AC 
implies that countries share some fundamental characteristics in relation to terrorism activities 
(e.g the mere occurrence of terrorism), such that differences across countries are only in terms 
of initial levels of terrorism. In this light, the absence of AC in the total terrorism panel for the 
System GMM specifications may be traceable to differences in such initial levels. Conversely, 
evidence of AC in terrorism implies that beyond the constraint of dissimilar initial conditions 
among sampled developing countries, common fundamental factors that exist have led 
countries with low-levels of terrorism to be catching-up their counterparts of higher levels.  
 On the other hand, CC illustrates the type of catch-up where-by the country’s 
equilibrium in the long-run or steady state depends on institutional and structural features that 
are fundamental to currency/economic unions. Hence, when sampled countries distinguish 
themselves in terms of determinants of terrorism, conditional catch-up is likely to occur. 
Therefore if sample countries differ in the structural and institutional features that explain 
terrorism, some form of catch-up is likely to take place. In this vein, conditional catch-up 
depends on the conditioning information set or variables we choose and empirical test. While 
we have employed five macroeconomic variables, some empirics have been limited to two 
variables (e.g Bruno et al., 2012). It follows that in terrorism dynamics (domestic, 
transnational and total) for which CC has been established to be apparent, sampled countries 
have differences in the employed conditioning information set (political globalisation, civil 
conflicts, inflation, exchange rate, foreign aid and GDP growth). Conversely, as for unclear 
terrorism for which we have established no evidence of CC, consistent with Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2015), sampled countries with unclear terrorism could instead be converging to 
a lower equilibrium. Overall, the catch-up process implies that common policies are feasible 
across sampled countries.  
 We have also established that irrespective of catch-up dynamic, the rate of catch-up is 
higher for domestic terrorism relative to transnational terrorism. This implies that feasibility 
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of common policies against domestic terrorism is higher relative to common initiatives 
against transnational terrorism. In other words, the rates of domestic terrorism in countries 
with initially low levels of domestic terrorism are growing faster than in the corresponding 
tendency for transnational terrorism. 
 The time for full catch-up required for the implementation of common policies without 
distinction of nationality has also been established to be in a horizon of 13.34-19.92 years for 
domestic terrorism and 24.67-27.88 years for transnational terrorism. The implication of this 
is that from a projection date of 2009, there is still a long way to go for the implementation of 
common policy initiatives. Hence, while such initiatives are feasible now, the adoption 
process would take quite some time. The process can be facilitated by improving cross-
country institutional and structural characteristics that are inhibiting the convergence process.  
 Before we conclude, it is important to point-out a few caveats to the empirics. In 
essence, using econometrics to achieve beyond accepting or refuting existing theories is not 
without risks. Nonetheless, as we have clearly articulated in the motivation of the study, there 
is a growing strand of literature extending the theoretical underpinning of catch-up in income 
to other development areas. As Miller and Upadhyay (2002) and Apergis et al. (2010) have 
documented, differences in initial conditions and multiple equilibria are recurrent 
shortcomings of the beta catch-up modelling approach.  
   
 
5. Conclusion and further directions 
 
This paper models the feasibility of common policy initiatives against global terrorism, as 
well as timelines for their enforcement. The empirical evidence is based on 78 developing 
countries for the period 1984-2008. Employed terrorism dynamics are domestic, transnational, 
unclear and total terrorism. Absolute (or unconditional) and conditional catch-ups are 
modelled using Generalised Methods of Moments. We establish consistently that, the rate of 
catch-up is higher in domestic terrorism relative to transnational terrorism. The time to full 
catch-up required for the implementation of common policies without distinction of 
nationality is found to be in a horizon of 13.34-19.92 years for domestic terrorism and 24.67-
27.88 years for transnational terrorism. Hence, from a projection date of 2009, in spite of 
decreasing cross-country differences in terrorists’ attacks, there is still a long way to go before 
feasible common policy initiatives can be fully implemented without distinction of 
nationality. This conclusion is in line the 2014 Global Peace Index report “Many macro 
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factors have driven the deterioration in peace over the last seven years including the 
continued economic repercussions of the Global Financial Crisis, the reverberations of the 
Arab Spring, and the continued spread of terrorism. As these effects are likely to continue into 
the near future; a strong rebound in peace is unlikely” (Arnet, 2014).    
 Given that terrorism activities also depend on revolutionary tendencies that are 
spreading across nations, an interesting future research direction could be to employ 
alternative instruments like spatial econometrics in order to incorporate diffusion and spill 
over effects.  
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